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Looking Ahead to Ethics 2015: Or Why I Still
do not Get the ABA Model Conflict of
Interest Rules
RICHARD

E. FLAMM*

INTRODUCTION

Ideas about what constitutes ethical conduct-and, more specifically,
about what the law governing lawyers should be-would appear to be in a
perpetual state of flux.' Whether because of perceived problems with existing
ethical rules, changes in the way law has come to be practiced, or a melange
of other reasons including political expediency, it seems that a call goes outevery fifteen years or so-for a reappraisal of the rules regulating the way
lawyers conduct their affairs.
One such call, put out in the late 1960s, ripened into the ABA Model
Code of ProfessionalResponsibility (1970). Thirteen short years later that
Code was superseded by the markedly different ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (1983). Now those Model Rules, which some
jurisdictions have only just gotten around to adopting,2 are poised to be
supplanted by a substantially revised set of rules which are currently being
drafted by the Commission on Evaluation of The Rules of Professional
Conduct, colloquially known as the "Ethics 2000 Commission." Unless the
Ethics 2000 Commission's revised rules are the last word on ethics -and it
would appear that no one seriously believes that they will be-one could
speculate that, at the present pace, the call to begin the process of overhauling
the Model Rules II should go out in or about the year 2013.
Now, it might seem premature-if not downright cynical-to predict a
sunset date for professional conduct provisions that have not yet even been
* Richard E. Flamm, a private practitioner in Oakland, California, frequently acts as
a consultant and expert witness on matters pertaining to law firm and judicial disqualification.

Mr. Flamm, an adjunct professor of Professional Responsibility at Boalt Hall (the University
of California at Berkeley), is Chair of the Alameda County Bar Association Ethics Committee
and Vice-Chair of the Bar Association of San Francisco Ethics Committee. The author of a
nationwide treatise on Judicial Disqualification, he is currently writing his second treatise on
lawyer and law firm disqualification. Mr. Flamm is a member of the Advisory Council to the
ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
1. Some might say "evolution," I prefer "flux."
2. See, e.g., Welch v. Paicos, 26 F. Supp.2d 244, 246 (D. Mass. 1998) (noting that
"[t]he ink is still wet on the Massachusetts Rules, which went into effect on January 1, 1998").
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fully drafted, much less adopted by the ABA' s House of Delegates. But it is
not only history which suggests that it will not be very.long before ground is
broken on yet another set of ethics rules. On several occasions, the
Commission itself has expressed the affirmative intention of making changes
to the existing Model Rules in a "minimalist" manner-thereby implicitly
eschewing any intention of considering the need for comprehensive rule
reform. Indeed, whereas both the Kutak Commission, which was charged
with the responsibility of drafting the original Model Rules, and the earlier
Commission, which crafted the provisions that eventually became the ABA
Model Code, appear to have believed their role was to propose a sweeping
overhaul of the reigning ethical constructs of their time, the Ethics 2000
Commission has, from the outset, approached its task as if it was doing little
more than bringing in the family car for a tune-up.
Some may quibble with just how "minimal" the Commission's proposed
amendments have actually been, and will be, when the Commission Drafts are
submitted to the House of Delegates in final form in or about July of next
year. The Commission has, moreover, made a concession to those who would
prefer more far-reaching changes in the Model Rules, by adopting a Work
Plan which contemplates that, in addition to suggesting amendments to the
existing rules, the Commission may propose new rules to respond to changes
that have occurred in the practice of law. No one can honestly quarrel,
furthermore, with either the Commission Members' credentials, or the
diligence with which they have tackled their duties under the able stewardship
of the Commission Chair, Chief Justice Norman Veasey of the Delaware
Supreme Court.
The fact is, however, that almost since its formation the Commission has
been pressing ahead with draft after draft of proposed revisions to the existing
rules. The Commission's Work Plan is, and always has been, bereft of any
expression of intention to seriously consider whether the rules on which the
Commission is striving mightily to build were structurally sound in the first
place.
Between the head of steam that has been built up, and the fact that the
Commission has stated a firm intention of wrapping up its work in only a little
more than a year, it would appear realistic to presume that, even though drafts
of a few proposed revised rules have only recently begun to be circulated for
public comment, the Commission would not be overly receptive to any
suggestion that it consider going back to square one.
The Commission's predisposition to work with what it had, rather than
to consider whether to evaluate the Model Rules afresh, is particularly
unfortunate when one considers the status of the Model Rules that are perhaps
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the most fundamental-the conflict of interest rules.3 As much of the
remainder of this article will attempt to demonstrate, the rules the ABA has
disseminated to deal with conflict problems (Rule 1.7-1.10), as presently
constituted, are so flawed that, in many instances, they cause more harm than
good. While the Commission has proposed a number of alterations to Rules
1.7-1.10, the vast majority of these have been cosmetic in nature; so much so
that those who had hoped for more profound changes might be forgiven for
being less than sanguine about the prospect that this Commission will be the
one to "fix" the conflict rules.
I. THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE CONFLICT RULES' STATED PURPOSE AND
How THEY ARE USED
Immediately preceding the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
are a series of "Scope" Notes. These explain what the Rules are supposed to
do. Scope Note 6 states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he Rules are designed to
provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct
through disciplinary agencies." The drafters go on to say that the Model Rules
"are not designed to be a basis for civil liability." In fact, "the purpose of the
Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as
procedural weapons .... Accordingly, nothing in the Rules should be deemed
to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary
consequences of violating such a duty."
Scope Note 6 suggests that the Model conflict of interest provisions, like
the rest of the Model Rules, were intended to serve two discrete purposes: to
provide guidance to lawyers and a framework for liwyer discipline. It is
equally clear that the conflict rules were not supposed to be used as grounds
for extra-disciplinary liability. However, an analysis of Rules 1.7-1.10, and
the many cases in which they have been cited, reveals that not one of these
three intentions has translated into practice.
First, while it has been suggested, perhaps euphemistically, that
"[c]ourts are not policemen of the legal profession," 4 -and that disciplinary
agencies, rather than courts, should be the ones to enforce the Model

3. As Professor Charles Wolfram has suggested, conflicts of interest are "probably the
most pervasively felt of all the problems of professional responsibility that might haunt
lawyers." CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.1, at 313 (1986).

4. See U.S. Football League v. National Football League, 605 F. Supp. 1448, 1463
n.31 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("that is a matter for the disciplinary arm of the bar"). Cf.W. T. Grant

Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671,677 (2d Cir. 1976) (observing that "[t]he business of the court is

to dispose of litigation and not to act as a general overseer of the ethics of those who practice
...before it").
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Rules'-it is common knowledge that alleged violations of the ABA's conflict
of interest provisions practically never result in discipline. One can point to
a handful of reported disciplinary cases in which the Model conflict rules, or
their Model Code forbearers, were invoked.6 The bald fact is, however, that
disciplinary agencies are much more apt to focus their attention and limited
resources on complaints of financial or substance abuse. They are almost
never called upon to discipline lawyers for conflicts;7 and, when they are, they
almost never do.'
If the Model Rules do not serve their avowed purpose of providing a
framework for discipline, then surely-if the Scope Notes are to creditedtheir primary function must be to provide an ethical compass for lawyers cast
adrift in the murky "legal ethics" sea. To anyone who regularly practices in
that arcane field, however, it is-or at least should be-readily apparent that,
when it comes to conflicts of interest, the ABA Model Rules have been at
least as unsuccessful as purveyors of "guidance" as they have been as framers
of "discipline."
To begin to understand why this is so, one need look no farther than the
"black letter" text of the ABA's "former client" conflict rule, Model Rule 1.9.
According to that rule: "A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a
matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a
substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents
after consultation."

5. U.S. FootballLeague, 605 F. Supp. at 1463 n.3 1. See also Society for Good Will
to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 722, 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (noting that, "[i]n
cases of real ethical violations, there is available comprehensive independent disciplinary
machinery to deal with them").
6. See, e.g., In re Dolan, 384 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 1978) (imposing public reprimand upon
an attorney for representing a buyer and a seller in a single real estate transaction). Cf. In re
McKee, 849 P.2d 509 (Or. 1993).
7. In his thoughtful recent analysis of the values impinged by a client's consent to
conflicts of interests, Professor Fred Zacharias of the University of San Diego observed that,
while conflicts have occasionally been the subject of discipline, an early 1974 study of client
complaints showed that, "in one jurisdiction during 1970, only 13 of 2,031 client complaints
alleged a conflict of interest." Fred Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 407,
437 n.154 (1998).
8. In a recent supplement to their treatise on legal ethics, ABA Ethics 2000
Commission Member Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., and his co-author William Hodes, stated that
professional discipline for engaging in conflicted representation has been "rare." See GEOFFREY

C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WniIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL

RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr 1.7:103, at 227-28 (Supp. 1998) (but predicting an increase
in disciplinary activity).
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At first blush, the rule might seem straight forward enough; and, insofar
as it purports to advise lawyers not to undertake representation adverse to
clients they have represented in the same matter, it may well be. It is probably
safe to say, however, that few lawyers worth their salt would need to consult
the Model Rules-or any other ethical authority---to know that, when a lawyer
sues a former client in the very same matter in which she represented that
client, something is seriously amiss. On the contrary, where Rule 1.9's
"guidance" really comes into play, and where it begins to unravel, is when the
drafters exhort lawyers not to act adversely to former clients in matters
"substantially related" to those they previously represented a client in.
The question of whether two matters are "substantially related" is neither
something a lawyer is likely to know a priori, nor something she is likely to
be able to figure out, with any degree of confidence, by analyzing Model Rule
1.9 or its comments. The term "substantial relationship" is not defined in Rule
1.9 (or elsewhere in the Model Rules), and none of the existing comments to
Rule 1.9 shed any light on what the drafters intended to convey by this term.9
It is not the case, moreover, that lawyers in need of guidance can
unearth a simple, easy-to-apply definition of "substantially related" by
examining the relevant case law. Depending in part on the jurisdiction in
which the substantial relationship question would be likely to arise, a court
might determine whether a former matter and present matter are "substantially
related" in accordance with a "strict" approach, pursuant to which the lawyer
would not be required to withdraw unless the matters were "essentially the
same; ' 0 a "liberal" approach, which calls for the lawyer to withdraw
whenever the matters are "similar or related,"11 in some "substantial" way; 2
or another approach, such as that employed by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, which focuses less on the similarity between the issues involved in
9. At the author's suggestion, the Commission has drafted a proposed definition of
"substantially related." In its present form, however, the Commission's definition would not
likely materially assist the practitioner in determining whether undertaking a later representation
would constitute a violation of the rule.
10. See, e.g., Vestron, Inc. v. National Geographic Soc., 750 F. Supp. 586, 595
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). See generallyRogers v. Pittston Co., 800 F. Supp. 350, 353 (W.D. Va. 1992)
(and citations therein).
11. See, e.g., Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985) ("Substantiality
is present if the factual contexts of the two representations are similar or related") (quoting Trust
Corp. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1983)) (quoting Trone v. Smith, 621
F.2d 994,998 (9th Cir. 1980)); Columbus Credit Co. v. Evans, 613 N.E.2d 671, 677 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992); Burkes v. Hales, 478 N.W.2d 37,42 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). Cf. Elan Transdermal
Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 809 F. Supp. 1383, 1388 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
12. See, e.g., Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1100; Thomas v. Municipal Court of Antelope
Valley J.D., 878 F.2d 285, 288 (9th Cir. 1989); Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. Norton Co., 113
F.R.D. 588, 592 (D. Minn. 1986).
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the two representations than on the relevance to the 3instant matter of the
confidences allegedly communicated in the prior one.
The dichotomy between these various approaches is perhaps best
exemplified by two New Jersey District Court cases. In Ciba-Geigy v. Alza
Corp.,4 the court declined to disqualify counsel from representing the plaintiff
in a patent infringement case involving the transdermal delivery of nicotine.
It did this despite the fact that the firm had formerly represented Alza in
litigation involving transdermal delivery systems, because of the difference
between the substances involved and resulting differences in the two
transdermal delivery systems. According to the court, because a qualitative
difference existed between the transdermal patches involved in the former and
present litigations the factual bases- for the two litigations were not
substantially related. 5
Later that same year the same court determined that Ciba-Geigy had
been wrongly decided. 6 In Kaselaan & DAngelo Associates, Inc. v.
D'Angelo,'7 the court observed that an examination of the factual bases
underlying the successive representations did not appear to be particularly
crucial to resolving the "substantially related" issue; and that, in the absence
of a supervening federal statutory or decisional law interest, a disqualification
standard that equated "substantially related" to "factually identical" was
unnecessarily restrictive. 8
In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 9 then Justice, now Chief Justice
Rehnquist, speaking of the attorney client privilege, said:
[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be
served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with
some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will
be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports
to be certain but results in widely varying applications by
the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.2"

13.
Cir. 1979).
14.
15.
16.
1992).
17.
18.
19.
20.

See Novo Terapeutisk Lab. A/S v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 607 F.2d 186 (7th
Cf. Production Credit Ass'n v. Buckentin, 410 N.W.2d 820, 823 (Minn. 1987).
795 F.Supp. 711 (D.N.J. 1992).
Id. at 717-18.
Kaselaan & D'Angelo Assoc., Inc. v. D'Angelo, 144 F.R.D. 235, 242-43 (D.N.J.
144 F.R.D. at 235.
Id. at 241-43.
449 U.S. 383 (1981).
Id. at 393.

1999]

CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES

Could not the same point be made of Model Rule 1.9's invocation to a
"substantially related matter?" If a lawyer seeking guidance cannot predict,
with "some degree of certainty," whether a former and present matter would
be deemed to be "substantially related" within the meaning of the rule, of what

utility as a source of "guidance" is that rule?

If the Model conflict rules do an inadequate job of accomplishing their
stated mission of providing guidance and a framework for lawyer discipline,
one might hope that, at least, they would not be regularly employed to achieve
the one end that they were expressly not intended to facilitate: supplying "a
basis for civil liability." The fact is, however, that the Model conflict rules are
routinely used for this purpose.2" The invocation of the conflict rules by
antagonists in civil proceedings is, moreover, clearly expanding, rather than
abating.22
The use of the ABA conflict rules as a cudgel, rather than as a compass,

has not been confined to a single type of proceeding. On the contrary, claims
that a lawyer has engaged in conflicted representation, or failed to disclose

such a conflict, 3 have supplied the basis for breach of contract actions, legal

malpractice claims, 25 and lawsuits filed for the express purpose of enjoining
the challenged attorney or firm from continuing to engage in conflicted
representation,26 as well as for proceedings seeking to preclude a "conflicted"
lawyer or firm from collecting a fee, or to affirmatively "disgorge" fees that
have already been paid.27
21. Lawrence J. Latto has suggested that the ABA's "unfortunate assertion" that the
Model Rules "have nothing whatever to do with the civil liability of lawyers, has been turned
into a dreadful obstacle to the proper development of the law in this area." Lawrence J. Latto,
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: A View From the Trenches, 26 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 697, 718 (1998). Latto notes, further, that Ethics 2000 Commission Member Geoffrey
Hazard, Jr., "who as Reporter for the Kutak Commission that initially produced the Model Rules
might be thought to bear a share of the responsibility, [has] dismissed these efforts to deny that
the Rules had anything to do with civil liability as 'predictably futile.., if not fatuous."' Id.
at 723. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still Don't Get It, 6 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 701, 718 (1993).
22. See, e.g., Linda Ann Winslow, Comment, Federal Courts and Attorney
DisqualificationMotions: A RealisticApproach to Conflicts of Interest62 WASH. L. REV. 863,
873-74 (1987).
23. Blecher & Collins, P.C. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1442, 1450 (C.D.
Cal. 1994).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Bowen v. Smith, 838 P.2d 186, 186-87 (Wyo. 1992); Lazy Seven Coal
Sales v. Stone & Hinds, 813 S.W.2d 400,402 (Tenn. 1991).
26. See, e.g., Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1284
(Pa. 1992); Hannan v. Watt, 497 N.E.2d 1307, 1311-13 (I11.App. Ct. 1986).
27. See, e.g., In re Prince, 40 F.3d 356, 361 (1 lth Cir. 1994) (and citation therein). See
also Eriks v. Denver, 824 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Wash. 1992).
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Perhaps more fundamentally, in spite of the fact that the Reporter for the
Commission that drafted the Model Code observed that the Code's
Disciplinary Rules were not intended to be used as rules governing
disqualification motions,2" and while some authorities have made that point
express in adopting the Model Rules,29 it is beyond cavil that conflict of
interest issues come before courts most frequently in the context of motions
seeking to dislodge opposing counsel.
ABA Model Rules 1.7,30 1.9,"' and 1.1032 have, in particular, provided
fertile sources for disqualification applications. Some courts refer uncritically
to these rules as if they were drafted for the express purpose of providing the
substantive disqualification standard.33 It may well be that the Kutak
Commission did not-intend that courts would treat the Model conflict rules as
if they were statutes, which courts have no power to amend or ignore; and,
indeed, some courts have recognized the express limitation on the scope of

28. John F. Sutton, Jr., How Vulnerable is the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility?,
57 N.C. L. REv. 497, 514-516 (1979). Cf Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 446 n.26 (2d
Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part,699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1983).
29. For example, the D.C. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr, Scope Note 4, states:
[Niothing in the Rules... is intended to confer rights on an adversary of
a lawyer to enforce the Rules in a proceeding other than a disciplinary
proceeding. A tribunal presented with claims that the conduct of a lawyer
appearing before that tribunal requires, for example, disqualification of
the lawyer and/or the lawyer's firm may take such action as seems
appropriate in the circumstances, which may or may not involve
disqualification.
30. See, e.g., British Airways v. Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J., 862 F. Supp. 889, 899
(E.D.N.Y. 1994); Manoir-Electroalloys Corp. v. Amalloy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 188, 195 (D.N.J.
1989); In re Estate of Shano, 869 P.2d 1203, 1209 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); In re Boyle's
Case, 611 A.2d 618, 619 (N.H. 1992).
31. See, e.g., Kaselaan, 144 F.R.D. at 245; Koch v. Koch Indus., 798 F. Supp. 1525,
1532 (D. Kan. 1992); Prisco v. Westgate Entertainment, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 266, 270 (D. Conn.
1992); Webb v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 811 F. Supp. 158, 163 (D. Del. 1992); State
v. Hunsaker, 873 P.2d 540, 544 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); State ex rel. McClanahan v. Hamilton,
430 S.E.2d 569, 573 (W. Va. 1993).
32. See, e.g., Harrison v. Fisons Corp., 819 F. Supp. 1039, 1041 (M.D. Fla. 1993);
Green v. Montgomery County, Ala., 784 F. Supp. 841, 848 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Geisler v. Wyeth
Lab., 716 F. Supp. 520,525 (D. Kan. 1989); Kahn v. Kahn, 846 S.W.2d 219,224 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993).
33. See, e.g., Manoir-Electroalloys,711 F. Supp. at 195 (indicating that, whenever
Model Rule 1.7 is breached, a per se rule of disqualification should be applied); Papanicolaou
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 720 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (If a lawyer
commits certain ethical infractions, Rule 1.10 requires disqualification of that lawyer's
colleagues).
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those rules. 4 Nevertheless, it is, as one federal district judge has noted,
"common lore" that the ABA provisions, though literally prescribing only the
bases of lawyer discipline, "[are] regularly used by courts to establish the
criteria for lawyer disqualification as well."3 5
As noted in Harrisonv. Fisons Corp.,36 "[a]lthough the Preamble to the

[Florida version of the] Rules states that [they] are not to be invoked as

procedural weapons in litigation, courts have consistently relied on ethics
codes to establish standards for ruling on claimed conflicts of interest."3 7 In
fact, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has opined that the ABA Rules reflect
the "national standard" to be used in ruling on disqualification motions.3"
Other courts, while acknowledging that a conflict rule violation does not

necessarily mandate disqualification of the offending lawyer or her firn, have

often discerned in those rules "guidance" on the disqualification issue.3 9
The fact that courts routinely turn to the ABA conflict rules for
assistance in determining whether to disqualify lawyers from participating in
proceedings before them is of immense consequence, because a decision to
disqualify counsel may visit other misfortunes on them, and on their clients
as well. In addition to suffering the immediate pecuniary consequences of
being separated from a client, a disqualified lawyer may be obliged to endure
unfavorable media treatment, a loss of reputation, the deprivation of an
expectation of a future fee, and the prospect of being disqualified from other
cases involving the same facts or parties. In addition, disqualified lawyers

34. In South Bank, N.A. v. Drummond Co., 589 So.2d 715, 719 (Ala. 1991), for
example, the Alabama Supreme Court, quoting the Scope Note to the ALABAMA RuLES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT, emphasized that "[t]he rules simply provide a framework for the
ethical practice of law." See also S & S Hotel Ventures Limited Partnership v. 777 S.H. Corp.,
508 N.E.2d 647, 650 (N.Y. 1987) (observing that the "Code of Professional Responsibility
establishes ethical standards that guide attorneys in their professional conduct"; but that, "when
raised in litigation, however-which in addition to matters of professional conduct directly
involves the interests of clients and others--the Code provisions cannot be applied as if they
were controlling statutory or decisional law").
35. United States v. Bullock, 642 F. Supp. 982, 984 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
36. 819 F. Supp. 1039 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
37. Id. at 1041 n.1.
38. Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1383 (10th Cir. 1994).
39. See, e.g., Baird v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 771 F. Supp. 24, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). Cf.
Papanicolaou,720 F. Supp. at 1083 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Because the Rules of Professional
Conduct are 'partly obligatory and disciplinary and partly constitutive in that they define a
lawyer's professional role,' courts... should look to them for guidance in determining whether
a case might be tainted by the participation of an attorney or firm guilty of an ethical lapse.")
(citation omitted); Morgan v. N. Coast Cable Co., 586 N.E.2d 88, 90 (Ohio 1992) ("Many
courts that have dealt with the issue of whether disqualification of counsel is proper have looked
to their respective codes of professional responsibility for guidance. Our research indicates that
courts in Ohio are not an exception to this practice.").
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may be censured,40 sanctioned, 41 sued by their clients, 42 and/or stripped of
their right to collect or retain the fees, and even the expenses, they have
43
incurred on their client's behalf.
For her part, the non-moving client may have to pay to bring a new
lawyer or firm up to speed; which, in some circumstances, may be onerous if
not impossible, as where the representation was undertaken pro bono publico.

Further, situations in which the disqualified lawyer or firm is forbidden from
consulting with successor counsel, 44 or otherwise providing it with the fruits
of disqualified counsel's work product, 45 are not unknown to the law.
Of course, one could take the position that Scope Note 6 is clear, and
that the ABA cannot be faulted if courts have uncritically applied the conflict
rules in ways the rule drafters never intended. But a fair reading of those rules
would lead an objective observer to conclude that, when a lawyer invokes one

40. See Commonwealth v. Willis, 552 A.2d 682, 695 n.10 (Pa. Super. 1988) (noting
that "[c]riticism of an attorney's ethical conduct in a published opinion is a common means of
reprimanding an attorney who violates ethical standards").
41. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Acme Elec. Co., 652 F. Supp. 182,
186 (E.D. Mo. 1986). Cf. Esser v. A. H. Robins Co., 537 F. Supp. 197, 204 (D. Minn. 1982)
(ordering that all expenses arising from the services to be rendered by the Special Master in
monitoring the withdrawal of the disqualified firm and transfer of work product to the substitute
firm were to be borne by the challenged firm). In some instances, disqualified firms have been
required to reimburse the moving party for expenses incurred in making the motion. See
Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1270 (7th Cir. 1983).
42. See, e.g., West Virginia Canine College v. Rexroad, 444 S.E.2d 566, 569 (W. Va.
1994).
43. See, e.g., Maritrans v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1285 (Pa.
1992) (noting that "[c]ourts throughout the country have ordered the disgorgement of fees paid
-- or the forfeiture of fees owed--to attorneys who have breached their fiduciary duties to their
clients..."). In Eriks v. Denver, 824 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Wash. 1992), the trial court ordered an
attorney it had found to have engaged in conflicted representation to return all of the fees, plus
prejudgment interest, paid by one set of his clients. The court relied on the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268-69
(1941), in which a unanimous Court observed that:
Where [an attorney] ... was serving more than one master or was subject
to conflicting interests, he should be denied compensation. It is no
answer to say that fraud or unfairness were not shown to have resulted.
... A fiduciary who represents [multiple parties] ... may not perfect his
claim to compensation by insisting that, although he had conflicting
interests, he served his several masters equally well ....
Only strict
adherence to these equitable principles can keep the standard of conduct
for fiduciaries "at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd."
Id. (quoting Justice Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
44. See Wagner v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 189, 196 (N.D. Ill.
1987).
45. See, e.g., E-Z Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
See generally Comment, The Availability of the Work Productof a DisqualifiedAttorney: What
Standard?, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1619 (1979).
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of those rules in the context of a disqualification or other extra-disciplinary
proceeding, the rule is being used precisely as it was intended to be. Indeed,
the ABA's pointed admonition in Scope Note 6 that "nothing in the Rules
should be deemed to augment ...the extra-disciplinary consequences of
violating such a duty" would appear to be logically irreconcilable with the
current thrust of the ABA's conflict of interest rules-particularly Model Rule
1.10 which, its very title ("Imputed Disqualification") suggests, seemingly can
46
have no purpose but to "augment" those extra-disciplinary consequences.
II. SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS WITH THE MODEL CoNFLICT RULES
If the only problem with the ABA conflict rules was the disparity
between what they were expressly intended to do and how they are actually
used everyday in practice, the problem might be amenable to resolution by
some diligent word smithing.47 But the rules also manifest some glaring
substantive deficiencies. For example, while Rule 1.7, as presently
constituted, is supposed to set forth a "general" conflict of interest rule, there
is nothing "general" about Rule 1.7.48
The word "general" is defined in Webster's Dictionary, alternatively, as
"involving or applicable to the whole" or as "concerned or dealing with
universal rather than particular aspects."49 Rule 1.7 would fail to qualify as
a "general" rule under either definition. On the one hand, Rule 1.7 does not
deal only with "universal" aspects, but rather focuses on details that are
specific (and, in some instances, picayune).5 ° Conversely, Rule 1.7 is not
"applicable to the whole" realm of conflicts, because it does not encompass
any of the types of conflict situations enumerated in the conflict rules which
follow: Rule 1.8 and 1.9.
All three of the Reporters to the Ethics 2000 Commission have described
the nature of the interrelationship between Rule 1.7 and 1.8 as "confusing."
It is not altogether surprising that there would be some confusion about this

46. If one were to juxtapose the stated purposes of the ABA conflict rules with the
reality of how they have almost universally come to be employed in practice, a cynical observer
might consider that the net effect of the rules-if not their true (but unstated) purpose--is not
to provide ethical lawyers with "guidance," but to supply Machiavellian lawyers with a large,
growing and exceedingly fertile source of ideas.
47. The Ethics 2000 Commission has already been invited, on multiple occasions, to
consider simply deleting Scope Note 6.
48. The author assumes arguendo that attempting to define the slippery concept of
"conflict of interest" is a good idea in the first place.
49.
50.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 944 (1981).
See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.7 cmt. 13 (1998)

(discussing the conflict questions that may arise in estate planning and administration).
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interrelationship. Whereas the black letter text of Rule 1.7(a) reflects the
rule's purpose of defining when conflicts of interest exist which would make
it improper for a lawyer to "represent a client," only one of the ten discrete
rules enumerated in Rule 1.8 is addressed to questions involving the propriety
of representation. 5
Just as Rule 1.8 does not provide "specific" applications of the so-called
"general" conflict rule, Rule 1.7 does not apply to-in fact does not even
mention-the most common conflict situation; i.e., that which arises when a
lawyer acts adversely to the interests of a former client. Former client
conflicts are treated in Rule 1.9. They are mentioned in Rule 1.7 only insofar
as the lawyer's prior representation of them may limit the lawyer's present
representation of a currentclient.
Rule 1.7 is subject to criticism not only because it fails to deliver on its
promise to supply a "general" conflicts rule, but for more concrete
shortcomings. By way of example, Rule 1.7 states that a disqualifying conflict
of interest exists if "the representation of one client will be directly adverse
to another client." But, just as Rule 1.9's drafters omitted a definition of
"substantial relationship," the drafters of Rule 1.7 neglected to explain what
they mean exactly by the concept of "direct" adversity. Does direct adversity
exist only when a lawyer sues one client on behalf of another, or does the term
connote something less?52
Rule 1.10 is, if anything, even more troubling than the prior three.
Pursuant to that rule, "[w]hile lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them
shall represent a client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that
any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by [the
conflict of interest rules]."
The concept that a law firm should be "vicariously" disqualified from
acting adversely to the interests of a client or former client whenever one of
its members would be, is well entrenched in the Model Rules, the case law,
and in the American Law Institute's (ALl) soon to be adopted Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. Indeed, the imputed disqualification

51. That is why, whereas Rules 1.7 and 1.9 are frequently cited as the grounds for
motions to disqualify, Rule 1.8 is almost never invoked as a basis for disqualification.
52. See, e.g., GATX/Airlog Co. v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines, 8 F. Supp.2d 1182 (N.D.
Cal. 1998) (disqualifying a law firm for allegedly acting in a manner adverse to the interests of
a current client, in a matter wholly unrelated to any the firm had ever represented that client on,
even though the client had not previously been a party to the case in which the firm was
allegedly acting adversely to its interests). Cf State ex reL Morgan Stanley & Co. v. MacQueen,
416 S.E.2d 55, 59-60 (W. Va. 1992) (and citations therein). See generally Nathan M. Crystal,
Disqualificationof Counself6r UnrelatedMatter Conflicts of Interest, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
273, 279-80 (1990).
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doctrine appears to have been accepted so uncritically that one might be
tempted to assume that the principles upon which the rule was based are selfevident.
It may be worth noting, however, that neither an early treatise by Justice
Henry Williams of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was published
posthumously under the title Legal Ethics and Suggestions for Young
Counsel,53 the ABA's own original Canonsof Ethics (1908), a later book
on the same subject by George Wareville,54 or the first attempt at a
comprehensive treatise on legal ethics by Professor Henry Drinker,"5
even mention the concept of disqualification, much less "imputed"
disqualification. The doctrine, upon examination, turns out to be a relatively
modem innovation.
Given the recent genesis of the imputed disqualification rule, one might
expect that the Commission would not give its imprimatur to Rule 1.10's
renewal in Model Rules II without examining just how well the doctrine has
worked in practice. At a minimum, one might hope the Commission would
at least consider some of the questions which the rule invites. For example,
are the various presumptions which underlie Rule 1.10 really as "common
sense" based as Professor Monroe Freedman has suggested? 6 For example,
if the drafters are willing to trust lawyers enough to allow them to attempt to
rebut the presumption of shared confidences once a "tainted lawyer" has left
the challenged firm, by testifying that no lawyer remaining in the firm has
"protected" information, why would they not allow them to attempt to rebut
the same presumption by testifying that a lawyer who has not left the firm
never received material, confidential information in the first place?
Also, in most circumstances at least, is not the rule that no lawyer in a
firm can do what any other lawyer in the firm would be prohibited from doing
by Rule 1.9 just a cosmetic remedy for an "appearance of impropriety;" and,
if so, did the ABA not implicitly repeal the "appearance" basis for withdrawal
when it eliminated Canon 9 back in 1983? Further, if a firm is invariably
subject to "imputed" disqualification whenever one of its members would be
precluded from undertaking representation by Rule 1.9, as Rule 1.10 indicates
on its face, would the rule not, in many instances, result in the type of "double
imputation" of confidences that many courts have found to be improper?5 7
53. See generally HENRY W. WHIIAMS, LEGAL ETI-cs AND SUGGESTIONS FOR YOUNG
COUNSEL (1906).
54. See generally GEORGE WAREVILL., ESSAYS INLEGAL ETHics (2d ed. 1920).
55. See generally HENRY DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (1953).

56. See Monroe H. Freedman, Caveat Lector: Conflicts of Interest of AL! Members in
Draftingthe Restatements, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 655 (1998).
57. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564,1577 (Fed.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19

Finally, does a rule like Rule 1.10, which is frequently invoked in
support of tactically-based disqualification motions-and which courts
frequently rely on to justify draconian disqualification orders that, in many
jurisdictions, cannot be effectively appealed-really serve the interests of
ABA members or the public in general? If not, how did the ABA come to
adopt and advocate such a rule?
Instead of mulling over these questions, the Ethics 2000 Commission has
proposed changes to Rule 1.10(a) which seem designed to facilitate its use as
a tactical weapon. For example, Commission drafts would introduce into the
ABA conflict rules the concept of a "personally disqualified" lawyer. By so
doing, the Commission would go beyond what even the drafters of the
58
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers were willing to do.
CONCLUSION

In contrast to the work of the Kutak Commission, which was largely
performed behind closed doors, Ethics 2000 Commission meetings have been
characterized by refreshing openness and candor. The Commission has,
furthermore, expressed a genuine willingness to consider very seriously
proposals for bite-sized Model Rules' modifications. In contrast, however,
calls for a wholesale reexamination of the Model Rules-or any significant
one of them--have fallen upon deaf ears.
To those of us who believe that a more comprehensive re-evaluation of
the Model Rules-particularly the conflict of interest rules- is needed, it
would appear that the Ethics 2000 Commission, however well-intentioned, is
not likely to provide the answer. It may not be too soon to begin thinking
about-and laying the groundwork for-the new Code of Ethics that the ABA
may be expected to start working on in or about the year 2013.

Cir. 1984); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1341, 1346 (5th Cir. 1981)
(and cases cited therein); Richard v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 735 F. Supp. 206, 208 (E.D.
La. 1990); Petroleum Wholesale, Inc. v. Marshall, 751 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tex. App. 1988).
58. In the Comment to section 203 of the Restatement, the ALl indicated that its
"imputation rules are applicable.., in deciding whether to disqualify a lawyer from acting in
a matter." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFLAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 203 cmt. A (1996). Yet, the
ALl carefully refrained from using the words "disqualify" and "disqualification" anywhere in
the text. Instead, the ALl referred to a "personally prohibited lawyer." Id. To my mind,
however, perhaps the single most troubling aspect of the amendments to Model Rule 1.10 which
have been proposed to date is one which describes a situation which, the reporters say, "could
form the basis of a disqualification order, but ordinarily will not result in lawyer discipline."
If the Model Rules are not intended to "augment... the extra-disciplinary consequences of
violating a duty," what purpose, I am constrained to ask, does this comment have?

